The paper traces the relationship between attachment processes and the development of the capacity to envision mental states in self and others. We suggest that the ability to mentalize, to represent behavior in terms of mental states, or to have "a theory of mind" is a key determinant of self-organization which is acquired in the context of the child's early social relationships. Evidence for an association between the quality of attachment relationship and reflective function in the parent and the child is reviewed and interpreted in the context of current models of theory of mind development. A model of the development of self-organization is proposed which has at its core the caregiver's ability to communicate understanding of the child's intentional stance. The implications of the model for pathological self-development are explored, with specific reference to the consequences of maltreatment.
The "self" and concepts allied to it are cur-continuity through time, creates a sense of freedom or initiative, and generates the experently experiencing a considerable revival of interest from social scientists and develop-riences leading to the distinctness of oneself as a person. Modern developmental psycholmentalists (e.g., Bracken, 1996; Cicchetti & Beeghly, 1990; Cicchetti & Toth, 1994) . Psy-ogy has brought us closer to a full understanding of the mental processes which combine to chological interest in the self is usually traced to James' (1890, 1892) distinction of two as-organize the representation of oneself. pects of the self, the "I" (self as subject) and the "Me" (self as object). The I is Reflective Function the active agent responsible for constructing the self-concept of Me. To paraphrase in Developmentalists over the past 10 years have drawn attention to the remarkable capacity of the terms of current cognitive neuroscience, the Me is the mental representation, while the young children to interpret their own and other people's behavior in terms of mental I embodies the mental processes or functions which underpin representations of the self states. Reflective function is the developmental acquisition that permits the child to re- (Mandler, 1985) . The I organizes and interprets experience, ensures the experience of spond not only to other people's behavior, but to his 1 conception of their beliefs, feelings, hopes, pretense, plans, and so on. Reflective ingful and predictable. As children learn to has great generalizability and explanatory value. Recent philosophers of mind (Hopkins, understand people's behavior, they can flexibly activate, from multiple sets of self -other 1992; Wollheim, 1995) have extended Dennett's approach to unconscious processes. representations organized on the basis of prior experience, the one(s) best suited to respond They illustrated that one of Freud's most substantive contributions was to extend folk psyadaptively to particular interpersonal transactions.
chology to unconscious mental states, a theory of unconscious mind, thus making those The interdependence of reflective function as it applies to others and to the self was high-aspects of behavior meaningful which-using the ordinary constructs of intentionalitylighted by the second pioneer of psychological self theory, Cooley (1902 Cooley ( /1964 : "The make little sense (e.g., dreams, neurotic symptoms, humor). These behaviors may be underthing that moves us to pride and shame is not the mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an stood if we add unconscious beliefs, thoughts, and feelings to our everyday model of the imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another's mind" (p. 153). De-mind. Extending these ideas, we consider reflecvelopmentally, this may be thought to imply that a mental operation is required in early tive function to be the mental function which organizes the experience of one's own and childhood, to derive the self-state from the apperception of the mental state of the other. others' behavior in terms of mental state constructs. Reflective function concerns knowlExploring the meaning of others' actions is then a precursor of children's ability to label edge of the nature of experiences which give rise to certain beliefs and emotions, of likely and find meaningful their own psychological experiences. This ability arguably underlies behaviors given knowledge of beliefs and desires, of the expectable transactional relationthe capacities for affect regulation, impulse control, self monitoring, and the experience of ships between beliefs and emotions, and of feelings and beliefs characteristic of particular self-agency, the building blocks of the organization of the self. In previous papers (e.g., Fo-developmental phases or relationships. Its essence is not that the individual should be able nagy, Steele, Moran, Steele, & Higgitt, 1991a) we have labeled the predisposition to under-to articulate this theoretically, and this is clear in our operationalization (Fonagy, Steele, stand behavior in mental state terms reflective self-function, or more simply reflective func- Steele, & Target, 1997) . Individuals differ in the extent to which they go beyond observtion.
The notion of reflective function is rooted able phenomena to explain their own or others' actions in terms of beliefs, desires, plans, in Dennett's (1978 Dennett's ( , 1987 proposal that three stances are available in the prediction of be-and so on. This undoubtedly high level cognitive capacity is, we believe, an important dehavior: the physical stance, the design stance, and the intentional stance. Dennett's thesis is terminant of individual differences in self-organization, intimately involved with many that explanation in terms of beliefs and desires, so-called intentional states, provides defining features of selfhood such as self-consciousness, autonomy, freedom, and responsigood grounds for predicting human behavior-the only grounds accessible to all of us; bility (Bolton & Hill, 1996; Cassam, 1994) .
Intentional stance, in the broad sense considthis knowledge is embodied in the theory of mind of folk psychology (see Churchland, ered here (i.e., including apparently irrational unconscious motives), explains one's own be-1986; Mele, 1992) . 2 Theory of mind is an interconnected set of havior and therefore creates the continuity of self-experience which is the underpinning of beliefs and desires, attributed to explain a person's behavior. The theory of mind concept a coherent self-structure.
It is important that reflective function is not conflated with introspection. Bolton and 2. Dennett's formulation is unnecessarily restrictive (BolHill (1996) note that the weakness of intro- ton & Hill, 1996) . It does not address predicting the behavior of systems which do not function rationally. spection is to define mental states in terms of conscious motivation rather than, as here, in do not ask what the child feels about the mental states he encounters in others. Yet, in this terms of their capacity to regulate behavior. Introspection or self-reflection is quite differ-context at least, the question of knowledge and that of emotional investment are evient from reflective function as the latter is an automatic procedure, unconsciously invoked dently closely related. The child may know what the other feels but care little or not at all in interpreting human action. We see it as an overlearned skill, which may be systemati-about this; alternatively this information, for some youngsters, may be an issue of survival. cally misleading in ways much more difficult to detect and correct than mistakes in con-The emotional significance of mental states determines the evolution of the capacity or scious attributions would be. Reflective function similarly lends a shape and coherence to structure available for processing, but this is not usually addressed. In current models of self-organization which is outside awareness, in contrast to introspection, which has a clear theory of mind development the child tends to be seen as an isolated processor of informaimpact on experience of oneself.
Our central concern here is the acquisition tion, engaged in the construction of a theory of mind using biological mechanisms which of reflective function and the light this might cast on the development of self-organization. may fail if the child's endowment is poor.
This, from the viewpoint of developmental Baron-Cohen and Swettenham (1996) appropriately ask " . . . how on earth can young psychopathology and its psychosocial treatment, is a barren picture which ignores the children master such abstract concepts as belief (and false belief) with such ease, and central role of the child's emotional relationship with the parents or other caregivers in roughly at the same time the world over?" (p. 158). Their answer is that of modularity theo-fostering the capacity to understand interactions in terms of mental states. The developrists, along the lines of Chomsky's solution to the problem of the acquisition of a knowledge ment of children's understanding of mental states is embedded within the social world of of syntax. They postulate an innate (learning) mechanism with a specific location in the the family, with its interactive network of complex and at times intensely emotionally brain (see also Leslie, 1994; Segal, 1996) . Other current psychological theories stress the charged relationships, which, after all, constitute the primary content of early reflection. cognitive precursors of theory of mind. Some favor the folk psychology, theory-theory, ap-Therefore it should not surprise us that the nature of family interactions, the quality of paproach assuming that the child evolves a scientific theory-like network of interdependent rental control (Dunn, Brown, Somkowski, Telsa, & Youngblade, 1991b) , parental talk propositions about the mind on the basis of experience (e.g., Botterill, 1996; Gopnik, about emotions (Denham, Zoller, & Couchoud, 1994) , and the depth of parental dis-1996). Others assume that theory of mind is acquired via simulation of the mental state of cussion involving affect (Dunn, Brown, & Beardsall, 1991a) are all strongly associated the other, either through making inferences from what we ourselves would do in the with the acquisition of the intentional stance in observational studies. The involvement of imagined circumstances (e.g., Goldman, 1993; Harris, 1992) or an even more radical assump-the family in the child's acquisition of a theory of mind is further highlighted by the rotion of imagined transformation into the other which does not involve introspection or infer-bust finding that the presence of siblings in the family appears to improve the child's perence (Gordon, 1995) .
Both simulation and theory-theory models formance on a range of false-belief tasks ; Perner, Ruffman, & may appear to emphasize social learning aspects of the development of mentalization but, Leekman, 1994; Ruffman, Perner, Naito, Parkin, & Clements, in press ). upon closer scrutiny, their focus is at the level of mechanism rather than content. They quesModular accounts of theory of mind development have some difficulty with such data. tion how and when the child acquires knowledge of other minds in an abstract sense and Both the theory-theory and the simulation ac-counts also fall short of adequately addressing Jaffe (1997) have shown that interaction between baby and mother shows both self-reguthe social origins of this critical aspect of selforganization. In the theory-theory account lation and sensitivity to the state of the other.
Their facial expressions showed rapid fluctuamental concepts are thought to develop within a network of interdependent concepts on the tions: affect, space, and degree of contact in each 1 ⁄12 s time period responded to the exbasis of data from the social world, but the social world does not generally "give" con-pression of the other in the previous period, presumably on the basis of schemata of anticicepts to the child-it provides him with data for concept building. In the simulation model pated reactions. High coordination predicted later good cognitive performance, whereas mental state concepts are thought to arise from introspection, but this begs the question lower levels of coordination were optimal for secure attachment and easy temperament. Inof how children come to think of their own mental states in terms of feelings, beliefs, terestingly, security with the mother in the Strange Situation at 1 year was better prewishes, and so on. This paper attempts to explore the role of parent-child relationships in dicted by coordination with a stranger than with the mother at 4 months. the transformation of prereflective experience of mental states into reflective understanding
Interactions at this stage may be argued to be presymbolic, in the sense that they are nonof them. Within this social context both social models of mentalization may have their place; mentalistic; the infant is not required to represent the thoughts or feelings of the caregiver. the predominance of one or other route to understanding the mind may be a function of in-However, they involve reference to future states such as goals as explanatory constructs dividual differences between children and between environments, but, in our view, a in the interpretation of the behavior of the other. Thus they can be used to predict behavsatisfactory model must have the child's relationships with attachment figures as its start-ior although these structures would be limited in their capacity to modify behavior. Recent ing point.
experimental work by Gergely and Csibra (e.g., Gergely, Nadasdy, Csibra, & Biro, 1995) Developmental Roots of Reflective suggests that the infant's perception of social Function in Infancy contingencies by the second half of the 1st year is teleological in that they make refer-"Teleological" stance ence to future states (goals) as explanatory entities in the interpretation of behavior based There is general agreement that self-organization initially entails the integration of body-on the principle of "rational action." The teleological stance is applied by infants to human related experiences, defining the physical boundaries of self and world (e.g., Brown-and nonhuman objects alike. Studies by Csibra (1997) demonstrated that inell & Kopp, 1991) . Once the physical self is established, social exchanges, the identifica-fants express surprise when nonhuman but moving objects (such as various sized discs in tions of social boundaries and, somewhat later, the identification of social causality be-a computer-generated animated display) appear to act "irrationally"-not choosing the come central self-functions. The caregiver's recognition of the child's intentional stance, optimal action given specific goals and reality constraints. The infant is assumed to extend however, is communicated nonverbally, beginning at birth. Between birth and 5 months, teleological models beyond the prediction of human behavior. Teleological models, howface-to-face exchanges of affective signals between infant and caregiver (Beebe, Lach-ever, evolve into mentalizing ones in the restricted domain of human action. They bemann, & Jaffe, 1997; Tronick, 1989) play a key role in the development of the child's rep-come fully mentalizing once representations of goal states come to be thought of as desires, resentation of affect.
For example, using a microanalytic obser-and constraints come to be thought of in terms of the agent's beliefs about physical reality. vational paradigm, Beebe, Lachmann and The infant's behaviors in dyadic interac-contingent actions of others. Taking Stern's (1985) and Neisser's formulation of the intertions are underpinned by an evolving model of rational action by the caregiver. We would personal self together, we can identify three aspects of the intersubjective development of argue that the development from teleological to mentalizing models will depend upon the the self, which Mundy and Hogan (1994) term instrumental action states, sensory or percepquality of interpersonal interactions between the infant and the caregiving adult. It should tual action states, and affective action states.
Rogers and Pennington (1991) offered a be noted that although such models may merely represent rational action, it is the per-model of the cognitive underpinnings for such an intersubjective process in their concept of ceived rather than actual rationality of an act which defines the teleological model. Thus representational mapping (the process of coordinating representations of self and other) misapprehension of reality constraints (e.g., assumed dangerousness) will provide and cre-which is thought to underlie the sharing of affect, attention, and higher order aspects of ate a model where action which is clearly irrational from an external standpoint is neverthe-cognition such as beliefs. The existence of imitation skills from the neonatal stage repreless seen as based on the principle of rational action. The predictive significance of the in-sents strong evidence for the model (Meltzoff, 1993) . The acquisition of an appreciation of fant's response to a stranger in the Beebe study suggests that representations (working mental states, however, goes beyond mirroring. models) of self-other relations even when not yet mentalized begin to vary in quality in the The development of an understanding of affect in self and other may be a good illustra1st year, and this quality is related to infantcaregiver interactions, as observed in the lab tion of the role of representational mapping in the development of reflective abilities (Gersituation. If sufficiently coherent to be generalized to other relationships in characteristic gely & Watson, 1996; Target & Fonagy, 1996) . Anxiety, for example, is for the infant ways, they may index processes crucial to the creation of a secure mother-infant bond.
a confusing mixture of physiological changes, ideas, and behaviors. When the mother reflects, or mirrors, the child's anxiety, this perRepresentational mapping ception organizes the child's experience, and he now "knows" what he is feeling. The Representational mapping is likely to underpin the gradual move in infancy from teleo-mother's representation of the infant's affect is represented by the child and is mapped on logical to mentalizing models of mind. Between 6 and 18 months the child becomes to the representation of his self-state. The discrepancy between these is helpful insofar as it increasingly able to match his mental state with that of the caregiver vis-à-vis a third ob-provides organization for the self-state and thus the caregiver's mirroring can become the ject or person, as, for example, in requesting or joint attention (Bretherton, 1991) . The higher order representation of the child's experience. Within this model mirroring would communication is evidently deliberate, since children at this phase try to repair failed com-be expected to fail if it is either too close to the infant's experience or too remote from it. municative bids and thus show some recognition of awareness and agency in self and other If the mirroring is too accurate, the perception itself can become a source of fear, and it loses including affective states, perceptions, and intentions (Stern, 1985; Wellman, 1993) . Neis-its symbolic potential. If it is unavailable, or is contaminated with the mother's own preocser (1991) suggested that based on perceptual processes, two preconceptual aspects of the cupation, the process of self-development is profoundly compromised. We may presume self emerge: the ecological and the interpersonal. While the former involves self-aware-that individuals for whom the symptoms of anxiety signify catastrophes (e.g., heart attack, ness in reference to perception of nonsocial surroundings, the latter is generated via the imminent death, etc.) have metarepresentations of their emotional responses which cancoperception of actions of the self and related not be limited in intensity through symboliza-plays in others as well as arriving at the regulation and control of his own emotions. The tion, perhaps because the original mirroring by the primary caregiver exaggerated the in-representational mapping of emotion displays and self-experience is seen here as a prototypfant's emotions.
Admittedly this is a speculative model, but ical instance of caregiver sensitivity, which, as we shall attempt to demonstrate, is likely it is empirically testable. It might help answer the thorny question of why individuals with to be an important component of the development of mentalizing. The sensitivity of the panic disorders attribute immense significance to physiologically relatively mild levels of caregiver prompts the child to begin organizing self-experience according to clusters of redisequilibrium. The suggestion here is that the metarepresentation, or symbolic representa-sponses which will eventually come to be verbally labeled as specific emotions (or desires). tion, of affect in these cases contains too much of the primary experience; hence, in-The high contingent response is the means by which this mapping can take place. The stead of labeling the experience having the potential to attenuate it, it tends to stimulate child's affective experiences are given further meaning by becoming associated with clusters and exacerbate symptoms of the affect state, which in turn accentuates the secondary ex-of reality constraints within the parent-infant interaction (leading to rudimentary beliefs pression, in a cycle of escalating panic.
3 In collaboration with George Gergely, we are about the causes and consequences of his emotional state). designing a series of studies of the infant's emotional understanding which will more directly test these ideas. In a recent study (Fo-Transmission of attachment security nagy et al., 1995), we have confirmed that mothers who soothe their distressed 8-month-The attachment system (Bowlby, 1969 (Bowlby, , 1973 (Bowlby, , 1980 ) is intimately connected with the proolds most effectively following an injection rapidly reflect the child's emotion, but this cess of representational mapping and the development of the reflective function of the self. mirroring is mixed with other affects (smiling, questioning, mocking display, and the like). There is general agreement that, as the self exists only in the context of the other, the deIn displaying such "complex affect" (Fó -nagy & Fónagy, 1987) they ensure that the velopment of the self is tantamount to the aggregation of experiences of self in relationinfant recognizes their emotion as analogous to, but not isomorphic with, their experience ships (e.g., Crittenden, 1994; Sroufe, 1990) .
Psychoanalytic object relations (Kernberg, and thus the process of symbol formation may begin. In this way, the representational map-1982; Winnicott, 1965) and attachment theorists (Bowlby, 1980) are in agreement that ping between affect of self and emotions of others, the exchange of affect between young repeated, invariant aspects of self-other relations are abstracted into internal representachild and caregiver, provides a unique source of information to the child about his own in-tional mental models and structured, to use Kernberg's term, into self-other-affect triads, ternal states.
We suggest that the meaning or sense of or internal working models, according to Bowlby. Although in its original formulation affect develops out of the integrated representation of the affect in self and other. The com-the concept of internal working model lacked specificity (Dunn, 1996) , more recent empiribination of the representation of self-experience and the representation of the reaction of cal work by psychoanalysts has greatly improved this (Horowitz, 1995;  Luborsky & Luthe caregiver elaborates the child's teleological model of the mind, and ultimately enables borsky, 1995).
At the same time, cognitive scientists have him to interpret and understand affective diselaborated the notion of procedural memories based on the nonconscious implicit use of past 3. In terms of linguistic theory, one may say that the sigexperience (e.g., Johnson & Multhaup, 1992;  nifier is not sufficiently "demotivated"; in other words it resembles the signified too closely. Schacter, 1992) . There is general agreement that the memory system is at least of a dual Steele, & Fonagy, 1996) . The small overlap between the two sets of classifications could nature with two relatively independent, neurologically and psychologically homogeneous, be equally well accounted for by assuming a temperament factor or by the generalization systems underpinning it. In addition to the autobiographical memory, which is at least in of the child's behavior with the mother (reflecting her attachment classification) to his part accessible to awareness, an important component to memory is a nonvoluntary sys-behavior with the father. The results suggest that the infant develops independent models tem which is implicit, principally perceptual, nondeclarative, and nonreflective. It is possi-(self-other schemata) for his major attachment relations based on his past history of inble that it is, at least in certain respects, more dominated by emotional and impressionistic teractions with each of those individuals. In turn, these interaction experiences are indexed information than its autobiographical counterpart (e.g., van der Kolk, 1994) . It stores the by the caregiver's representation of her or his attachment history. "how" of executing sequences of actions, motor skills being prototypical instances. The
There has been considerable research on the manner in which representations of attachprocedural knowledge that it contains is accessible only through performance. It mani-ment might influence the caregiver's behavior with the child. Van IJzendoorn's (1995) comfests itself only when the individual engages in the skills and operations into which knowl-prehensive meta-analysis identifies a "transmission gap," to the extent that the variability edge is embedded. Given these features, it seems likely that the schematic representa-which AAI narratives and SSn classifications share is not accounted for by observational tions postulated by attachment and object relations theorists are most usefully construed data concerning the sensitivity of caregiver behavior. Indeed, studies of the AAI-SSn asas procedural memories, the function of which is to adapt social behavior to specific sociation, which concurrently measured the sensitivity of caregiver-infant interaction, have interpersonal contexts.
The classification of patterns of attachment yielded negative (Ward & Carlson, 1995) or inconclusive results (van IJzendoorn, Kranenin infancy (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters, & Wall, 1978) taps into procedural memory burg, Zwart-Woudstra, Van Busschbach, & Lambermon, 1991) . Previously, we have sug- (Crittenden, 1990; Fonagy, 1995) . The strength of the Strange Situation (SSn) as a method gested that the transmission gap may be a consequence of the limitations of measures of of psychological assessment is to provide a powerful analogue of past situational contexts sensitivity . Sensitivity is a generic construct covering a wide range of within which knowledge concerning the "how" of behavior with a specific caregiver is parental behaviors (Belsky, Rosenberger, & Crnic, 1995) . Not all of these may be equally accrued. In this sense attachment is a skill, one which is acquired in relation to a specific powerful in engendering secure attachment. If secure attachment is conceived of as the accaregiver encoded into a teleological model of behavior. In the London Parent-Child Study, quisition of procedures of goal oriented rational action for the regulation of aversive the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI), administered before the birth of the first child to states of arousal within relationships (Cassidy, 1994; Sroufe, 1996) , it is argued that 100 predominantly middle class primiparous parents, was tested as a predictor of attach-these would be most consistently acquired and coherently represented when the child's ment classification at 1 year to mother and at 18 months to father (Fonagy, Steele, & Steele, acute affective state is accurately, but not overwhelmingly, reflected back to the child. 1991b). There was only a marginally significant association between the attachment clas-
The child who looks for a way of managing his distress identifies in the response of sification with mother and that with father. However, both SSn results were powerfully the caregiver a representation of his mental state which he may internalize and use as part predicted by the attachment classification of the respective parent on the AAI (Steele, of a higher order strategy of affect regulation.
The secure caregiver soothes by combining a tenden (1988; Crittenden & DiLalla, 1988) reports that maltreated toddlers display falsely "mirror" with a display incompatible with the child's affect (thus perhaps implying coping). positive affect which does not match their true feelings. At an extreme, the internalization of This formulation of sensitivity has much in common with the British psychoanalyst, Wil-the caregiver's defenses can not only lead to a failure to adequately represent and display fred Bion's (1962) notion of the role of the mother's capacity to mentally "contain" the actual emotional experience, but also to the construction of an experience of self around affect state intolerable for the baby, and respond in terms of physical care in a manner this false internalization (Winnicott, 1960) .
While the experience of "putting on an that acknowledges the child's mental state yet serves to modulate unmanageable feelings. act" may be common, particularly in adolescence (Harter, Marold, Whitesell, & Cobbs, The finding that the clarity and coherence of the mother's representation of the child medi-1996), here we are referring to the highly distressing experience of personality disordered ates between her attachment status and her behavior is certainly consistent with this model children who feel a sense of alienation from their core self (Bleiberg, 1994) . A strategy (Slade, Belsky, Aber, & Phelps, in press).
Ratings of the quality of the reflective func-many such children adopt later in development is to attempt to externalize this false part tion of each caregiver were found independently to predict the child's security of attach-of their self-representation, and manipulate the behaviors of others around them so these ment in the London Parent-Child Project (Fonagy et al., 1991a) . match the incongruent self-representation. We would argue that this explains the strangely If secure attachment is the outcome of successful containment, insecure attachment may coercive behavior with the caregiver of preschool children whose attachment in infancy be seen as the infant's identification with the caregiver's defensive behavior. Proximity to was classified as disorganized (Crittenden, 1992; Main & Cassidy, 1988) . In a desperate the caregiver is maintained at the cost of a compromise to reflective function. A dismiss-way they try, we suggest, to provoke behavior in another person which expresses part of ing (Ds) caregiver may altogether fail to mirror the child's distress because of the painful their self-representation experienced as "alien," they can then experience a more coexperiences this evokes for her or because she lacks the capacity to create a coherent image herent residual self . of the child's mental state. By contrast, the preoccupied (E) caregiver may represent the Secure infant becomes mentalizing child infant's state with amplification and insufficient marking, or complicated by responses to There is general agreement that the "harmoniousness of the mother-child relationship conthe parent's ambivalent preoccupation with her own experience, so much so that the sym-tributes to the emergence of symbolic thought" (Bretherton, Bates, Benigni, Camaibolic potential of the exchange is lost. In both cases the infant internalizes the caregiver's at-oni, & Volterra, 1979, p. 224). Bowlby recognized the significance of the emergence of titude and "this dysynchrony becomes the content of the experience of the self" (Critten-"the child's capacity both to conceive of his mother as having her own goals and interests den, 1994, p. 89).
separate from his own and to take them into account" (1969, p. 368) . Moss, Parent, and Infant attachment and developing self Gosselin (1995) reported that attachment security with mother was a good concurrent preWe may speculate about the impact of this on the development of the child's sense of self. dictor of metacognitive capacity in the child in the domains of memory, comprehension We know that avoidant infants respond to separation with minimal displays of distress and communication. The Separation Anxiety
Test, a projective test of attachment security, while experiencing considerable physiological arousal (Spangler & Grossman, 1993) . Crit-has been shown to be a good predictor of be-lief-desire reasoning capacity in 3-to 6-year-of secure attachment and false belief understanding was due to an as yet unknown and old children when age, verbal mental age, and social maturity were all controlled for (Fo-unmeasured third factor, such as temperament. More plausibly, it could be argued that nagy, Redfern, & Charman, 1997).
We have recently completed a prospective the facilitative effect of secure attachment is due to a more relaxed, task-oriented attitude, study of the relationship of attachment security to mother (1 year) and father (18 months) a general facility to engage in a cognitively demanding task, to relate to an adult experiand children's performance on three tests of theory of mind at 5 years (Fonagy, Steele, menter in a playful, exploratory way, and so on: that it reflects performance, rather than Steele, & Holder, submitted). Ninety-two of 96 children tested in the SSn at 12 and 18 competence. This suggestion could be tested using a false-belief task where implicit and months were seen. Eighty-two percent of those classified as secure at 12 months with explicit knowledge of false belief is separately assessed. If attachment security relates mother passed the belief-desire reasoning task, whereas 46% of those who had been to performance, then securely attached children would be expected to do better only on classified as insecure failed. Infant-father attachment (at 18 months) also predicted the the explicit (verbal/pointing) task. Implicit, procedural false belief reasoning would be exchild's performance, with 77% of infants classified as secure passing the test compared to pected to be facilitated by secure attachment only if this was associated with superior re-55% of children classified as insecure. There was some indication of an additive relation-flective capacity. This study remains to be performed, and is planned in our laboratory. ship, in that 87% of children with two secure relationships passed the belief-desire task, In what follows we shall, however hazardously, assume that the relationship between 63% of those with only one secure relationship and only 50% of those insecure with both false belief reasoning and security of attachment is nontrivial. did so. A similar but somewhat weaker pattern could be observed with the second-order
We then envisage two alternative sets of models to explain this relationship: (a) Secufalse-belief task. Thirty-six percent of those secure with both parents passed compared rity of attachment in infancy predisposes children to benefit from social processes directly with 23% who were secure with one and 9% who were insecure with both.
facilitating reflective abilities and social understanding (mediational models), and (b) seIn a somewhat smaller but careful longitudinal study of mother-infant dyads, Meins curity of attachment is an indicator of that quality of infant-caregiver relationship which and colleagues (Meins, Fernyhough, Russel, & Clark-Carter, in press) reported that 83% of generates psychological understanding. In this second model, the social processes which acchildren who were securely attached in infancy passed a false-belief task at age 4, in compari-celerate the mentalizing quality of self-organization are the very same as those which enson with 33% of insecurely attached peers. At age 5, 85% of securely attached children and sure security of attachment.
Mediational models would require that 50% of insecurely attached ones passed a task requiring an understanding of information ac-specific social processes are shown to be involved in this aspect of the development of cess. Although, probably because of its small sample, the study was not able to replicate our self-organization, and such social processes are enhanced in securely attached individuals. results on the false belief and emotion task, the general trend of the findings confirms that There are at least three candidates which meet these criteria. security of attachment is significantly linked to symbolic abilities in general and precocious
The first is pretense. There is evidence that children in their 3rd year who engage more mentalizing in particular.
There are both trivial and substantive ex-readily in cooperative interaction , and specifically in joint pretend play planations which could account for these findings. They would be trivial if the association (Astington & Jenkins, 1995; Youngblade & Dunn, 1995) , show superior mentalization and presumes a degree of trust, in so far as the child relies on the other's version or percepemotion understanding performance. There is a separate body of observations from longitu-tion of reality.
The second is talking. There is evidence dinal studies of attachment that preschool children securely attached to their mother in that conversations about feelings and about the reasons behind people's actions are linked infancy engage more strongly in fantasy play than avoidant children, whose engagement is to the relatively early achievement of reflective function (Dunn & Brown, 1993) . Threelow and whose pretend play is impoverished (e.g., Belsky, Garduque, & Hrncir, 1984 ; year-olds whose mothers spontaneously explained their emotions in a lab task showed Bretherton et al., 1979; Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985) . There is also evidence that se-enhanced emotion understanding over the subsequent 15 months (Denham et al., 1994) . curely attached young children can more easily use help from adults to elaborate their play Patterns of mother-child interaction characteristic of secure dyads-shared play, com- (Meins et al., in press; Slade, 1987) .
It is highly plausible that joint pretend play forting, or joking-are also contexts within which mothers' explanations of mental states or playfulness fosters the understanding of mental states. Deliberate role-taking is seen as are particularly found to facilitate reflective function (Dunn, 1996) . Secure attachment may integral to the off-line simulation model of the performance of mentalization tasks (Gold-then engender patterns of verbal interaction between child and caregiver which in turn supman, 1989). Within other models pretend play is an early manifestation of the theory of mind port thinking about feelings and intentions.
The central role of language in the acquisimechanisms (Leslie, 1987) . It is an important puzzle why 3-year-olds can understand that tion of mentalizing capacity was forcefully advanced by Smith (1996) , using primate evisomeone is entertaining a pretend representation but not a false belief (Harris, Kava-dence. Even more pertinent is Harris's (1996) proposal that the experience of engaging in naugh, & Meredith, 1994), a pretend/real distinction but not an appearance/reality one conversations per se shows children that people are receivers and providers of information, (Flavell, Flavell, & Green, 1987) . In the case of pretend, the representations, while they are whether or not the conversation refers to mental states. The structure of informative converdifferent from reality, are shared by those engaged in the pretend game. As Astington sations (e.g., being told about an event one has not witnessed, dissent and denial, filling (1996) put it, "they are intermental, not intramental" (p. 193). The sharing of representa-in information gaps) implies that partners in a conversation differ in what they know and tions different from reality may help in understanding situations where representations are believe about a shared topic. Effective conversation requires that gaps in shared knowlnot only different from reality but are not shared in a social pretend domain. In joint edge and belief are acknowledged and addressed. The measurement of attachment in pretend play or playfulness the adult adopts the child's mental stance and re-presents it to adults (Main, Kaplan, & Cassidy, 1985) emphasizes that secure attachment involves the child in relation to a third object which is symbolically held in mind by both (Target & greater sensitivity to the rules of conversation.
The third potential mediator is peer group Fonagy, 1996) . The scaffolding provided by the child's playmate in pretend play (Vygot-interaction. We have already noted that interaction with siblings enhances theory of mind sky, 1967) not only promotes earlier success but is also the mechanism whereby the devel-performance. There is an independent body of evidence which supports a strong link beopment of reflection comes about. Lillard (1993) argued that symbolic play may offer a tween secure attachment in infancy and ratings of peer competence: social orientation, "zone of proximal development" for the skills which subserve mentalization ability. Chil-reciprocity, popularity, and empathy (e.g., Elicker, Englund, & Sroufe, 1992 ; Park & dren with a secure attachment history may be more likely to engage in an activity which Waters, 1989).
Both simulation theory and theory-theory from Dunn's work suggests that these different contexts correlate poorly with one another explanations of the development of mentalization offer good explanations of the facilitative (Dunn, 1996) . For example, observational data shows that individual differences found effect of more intense peer group interaction (Ruffman et al., in press). Peer group interac-in pretend play, management of conflict, and talking about mental states are not correlated tion should increase the opportunities the child has for simulation, imagining what he between social situations (mothers, siblings, close friend) although each correlates with would see, think, feel etc., if he were in another person's situation. Equally, interaction sociocognitive assessments (e.g., Youngblade & Dunn, 1995) . These findings could with peers or older sibs could be seen from a theory-theory perspective as a rich source of suggest that there are a number of independent, simultaneous pathways between attachideas about how the mind works. An alternative view may be that enculturation is itself ment, social situations, and social cognition.
Alternatively, there is the second possibilthe source of the child's mental state concepts (Astington, 1996) . Bruner (1983) proposed ity, that the suggested mediating variables are not on the causal path at all, that their correlathat parents' tendency to treat the infant's spontaneous gestures as if they were inten-tion with the rate of acquisition of mentalization is spurious, that this facility is directly tional communications leads to infants seeing themselves as having intentions and starting related to the child's attachment status. Early experience with the caregivers in the 1st year to communicate intentionally. The social world (in the first instance, the parent) fosters of life may create a bedrock of theory of mind competence, helping the child to move from the child's sense of his mental self through complex linguistic and interactional pro-a teleological to a mentalizing model of behavior. What evidence do we have to support cesses, behaving towards the infant in a way that leads him eventually to share the assump-such a contention?
First, recall that Fonagy, Steele, Steele, and tion that his own behavior and (by simulation or the observation of similar interactions be-Holder (1997) found that a mother's attachment classification before the birth of the tween the caregiver and others) that of others may be best understood in terms of mental child was a powerful predictor of the child's theory of mind competence at 5 years. Alstates (Fonagy & Target, 1996; Target & Fonagy, 1996) . Through participation in activi-though, on the face of it, this can be accounted for by the mediational models, we beties of their culture they come to share their culture's way of understanding people's ac-lieve that there is now evidence that the caregiver brings something to the parenttions. If there is a process of "apprenticeship" in which peers and caregivers encourage the child relationship, evident even before the birth, which may be critical in the child's eschild's use of mentalizing concepts (Astington, 1996) , then secure attachment may be a tablishment of both secure attachment and mentalization. catalyst to this learning process. The greater readiness with which secure children are willWhat is this capacity? It is well established that in infancy, mothers of securely attached ing to explore and engage with the social world could then account for their mentalizing children are more sensitive to their children's needs (Ainsworth, Bell, & Stayton, 1971 ; Isaskill.
There is nothing exclusive about these bella, 1993). We have already mentioned that the parent's capacity to envision the mental three mediational models. Pretense often involves the use of mental state language. In-states of her or his own parents is predictive of the infant's security of attachment to each teraction with peers often involves both language and pretense. In general, social engage-parent (Fonagy et al., 1991a) . In a follow-up of the same group, the same capacity also prement tends to enhance social understanding, and such engagement is more accessible to se-dicted superior performance on a false belief task at 5 years, controlling for verbal fluency curely attached children. There is, however, a problem with a singular model. Evidence in the child. (However, this result was not found for all tasks which could be thought to ideas and feelings which determine his actions, and the reactions of others to him, index mentalization).
A path analysis of the above data showed which can then be generalized to other similar beings. The caregiver approaches the crying that not all the variance predicted was mediated by mother-infant attachment status at 1 infant with a question in her mind: "Do you want your nappy changed?" "Do you need a year. Mother's mentalizing ability seemed to have a direct as well as an indirect relation-cuddle?" The sensitive caregiver is unlikely to address the situation without having the pership with the child's theory of mind. Thus, the child's attachment security was not the only son in mind, so is unlikely to say to herself, "Are you wet around your bottom?" or "Have predictor; the mother's tendency to envision people (including the child) as mental entities you been standing alone too long?" The sensitive caregiver can bridge the focus on physialso seemed to be important.
The above data suggest that common cal reality and internally directed attention, sufficiently for the child to identify contingenmechanisms underpin attachment organization in caregiver and infant, and the preco-cies between internal and external experience.
Ultimately, the child arrives at the conclusion cious emergence of mentalizing in the child. It should be remembered that no clear causal that the caregiver's reaction to him may be understood as rational given the assumption path was identified among mediational models. The relative importance of various po-of an internal state of belief or desire within himself. Unconsciously and pervasively, the tential mediational mechanisms for the attachment-theory of mind relationship varies caregiver ascribes a mental state to the child with her behavior, treats the child as a mental according to context but intergenerational data may be consistent with at least two of the agent, which is perceived by the child and used in the elaboration of teleological models, models (pretense, language). Further experimental research which manipulates parental and then in the development of a core sense of mental selfhood. We assume that this, by behavior and explores attachment and theory of mind task performance (van IJzendoorn, and large, is a mundane process, happening routinely throughout early life, not reflected Juffer, & Duyvesteyn, 1995) will be necessary to show whether specific behaviors which en-on, and so rarely modified. Caregivers, however, differ in their ways of carrying out this gender secure attachment simultaneously enhance mentalizing. For such a study to be fea-natural human function. Some may be particularly alert to the earliest indications of intensible, we need a model of how attachment may directly relate to theory of mind perfor-tionality; others may need stronger indications before perceiving the child's mental state and mance. Next we outline a tentative model of how such a mechanism may operate.
modifying their behavior accordingly. Others, as we described in the context of early infancy, may systematically misperceive the child's states of mind, with resulting deformaReflective parenting and development tion of the child's sense of himself.
of mentalization
The child's development and perception of mental states in himself and others thus deWe take the view that the acquisition of the theory of mind is part of an intersubjective pends on his observation of the mental world of his caregiver. He is able to perceive mental process between the infant and caregiver (see Gopnik, 1993 , for a highly elegant elaboration states, to the extent that his caregiver's behavior implied such states. This he does when the of such a model). In our view, the caregiver facilitates the creation of mentalizing models caregiver is in a shared pretend mode of playing with the child (hence the association bethrough complex linguistic and quasilinguistic processes, primarily through behaving to-tween pretend and early mentalization), and many ordinary interactions (such as physical wards the child in such a way that leads him eventually to see that his own behavior may care and comforting, conversations with peers) will also involve such shared mentabe best understood by assuming that he has tion. This is what makes mental state concepts the mental state of the caregiver evokes intense anxiety through either frightening besuch as thinking inherently intersubjective; shared experience is part of the very logic of havior suggesting malevolence towards the child, or behavior suggesting fear, which may mental state concepts.
The parent's capacity to observe the mo-include fear of the child himself; and (c) the child needs to use disproportionate resources ment to moment changes in the child's mental state, then, lies at the root of sensitive care-to understand the parent's behavior, at the expense of reflecting on self-states. giving, which is viewed by attachment theorists as the cornerstone of secure attachment These factors combine, perhaps, to make disorganized infants become keen readers of (e.g., Ainsworth et al., 1978; Grossmann, Grossmann, Spangler, Suess, & Unzner, 1985 ; the caregiver's mind under certain circumstances, but (we suggest) poor readers of their Isabella & Belsky, 1991) . Secure attachment in its turn provides the psychosocial basis for own mental states. Thus, in terms of the rival models of theory of mind development, such acquiring an understanding of mind. The secure infant feels safe in making attributions of children may acquire a theory-theory of mind, but cannot use simulation of mentalizmental states to account for the behavior of the caregiver. By contrast the avoidant child ing with the same confidence as children whose attachment (albeit insecure) is orgato some degree shuns the mental state of the other, while the resistant child focuses on his nized. The alternative models may be more usefully thought of as alternative routes to own state of distress to the exclusion of close intersubjective exchanges. Disorganized in-mentalization, the first (theory-theory) accessible to all, the second (simulation) more fants may represent a special category; hypervigilant of the caregiver's behavior they use readily available to children whose early attachment relationships made such a strategy all cues available for prediction and may be acutely sensitized to intentional states, and safely possible. thus may be more ready to construct a mentalized account of the caregiver's behavior. We Theoretical model of development would argue (see below) that in such children of mentalization mentalization may be evident but it does not have the central and effective role in self-or-In previous papers (Fonagy & Target, 1996; Target & Fonagy, 1996) , we have attempted ganization which characterizes securely attached children.
to describe the normal development of reflective function in the child of 2-5 years. We We believe that most important for the development of mentalizing self-organization is suggested that there is a transition from a dual mode of experience to mentalization. Primarthat exploration of the mental state of the sensitive caregiver enables the child to find in ily from a clinical perspective, we advanced a number of propositions concerning the develher mind an image of himself as motivated by beliefs, feelings, and intentions, in other opment of the psychological part of the self.
These were words, as mentalizing. There is considerable evidence to support the view that secure at-1. Until 3 or 4 years of age, reflective function is characterized by two modes of relating tachment enhances the development of inner security, self-worth, and autonomy (e.g., Lon-internal experiences to the external situation:
(a) In a serious frame of mind, the child exderville & Main, 1981) . Disorganized infants, even if they acquire the skill of mentalization, pects the internal world in himself and others to correspond to external reality, and subjecfail to integrate this with their self-organization. There may be a number of linked rea-tive experience will often be distorted to match information coming from outside sons for this: (a) The caregiver of the disorganized infant is less likely to be reliably ("psychic equivalence mode"), (e.g., Gopnik & Astington, 1988 ; Perner, Leekam, & contingent in responding to the infant's selfstate, and further to show systematic biases in Wimmer, 1987); and (b) while involved in pretend play, the child knows that internal exher perception and reflection of his state; (b) perience does not reflect external reality (e.g., Reflective function and self-development Bartsch & Wellman, 1989; Dias & Harris, 1990) , but then the internal state is thought While mentalization may not be an unequivocally positive experience, Dunn's work shows to have no relationship to the outside world ("pretend mode").
us at any rate that the understanding of emotion at 3.5 years predicts a positive perception 2. Normally, the child then integrates these alternative modes to arrive at mentalization, of social relations, mature moral sensibility, and the understanding of complex emotions or reflective mode, in which mental states can be experienced as representations. Inner and (Dunn, 1996) . Stern (1985) pointed out that a sense of ownership of one's actions, whether outer reality can then be seen as linked, yet they are accepted as differing in important derived from the experience of forming plans, proprioceptive feedback, or the objective conways, and no longer have to be either equated or dissociated from each other (e.g., Gopnik, sequences of physical actions on the environment, contributes to the sense of self-agency. 1993). Mentalization comes about through the child's experience of his mental states being In our view, such agency also crucially depends on the quality and reliability of reflecreflected on, for instance through secure play with a parent or older child, which facilitates tive function, as ownership of action is intimately tied to the mental state (belief or integration of the pretend and psychic equivalence modes, through a process which may be desire) which initiated it. It is impossible to conceive of self-agency as fully established an elaboration of the complex mirroring of the infant by the caregiver. In playfulness, the by the physical actions of the child, as such a large proportion of these will fail to achieve caregiver gives the child's ideas and feelings (when he is "only pretending") a link with re-their intended objective, because of the child's immature physical and cognitive caality, by indicating the existence of an alternative perspective, which exists outside the pacities. The recognition of the child's intentional stance by others must then be critical in child's mind. The parent or older child also shows that reality may be distorted by acting making the thought "real" for the child. We believe that interaction which links percepupon it in playful ways, and through this playfulness a pretend but real mental experience tions, thoughts, and emotions as causes and consequences of action, and the contemplamay be introduced.
3. In traumatized children, intense emotion tion of mental states without fear, contribute significantly to self-agency. The earliest founand conflict lead to a partial failure of this integration, so that aspects of the pretend dation is presumably the baby's sense that he brings about the caregiver's mirroring behavmode of functioning become part of a psychic equivalence manner of experiencing reality. ior (Gergely & Watson, 1996) .
Of course, the core of self-agency must This may be because where maltreatment or trauma has occurred within the family, the at-originally lie with the body, where the infant's attempts to exercise control frequently mosphere tends to be incompatible with the caregiver "playing with" the most pressing as-succeed after early infancy. Higher level, more complex actions, particularly those which inpects of the child's thoughts; these are often disturbing and unacceptable to the adult, just volve others in the child's life, often require the reflective caregiver to make sense of the as they are to the child. The rigid, controlling behavior of the preschool child with a history young child's wishes and translate these into action sequences for the links between mental of disorganized attachment is thus seen as arising out of a partial failure on the part of states and action to be established. It is to be expected then that individuals who have expethe child to move beyond the mode of psychic equivalence in relation to specific ideas or rienced severe neglect or coercive, rigid, frightening, and, at an extreme, abusive parfeelings, so that he experiences them with the intensity that might be expected had they been enting will frequently experience their sense of self-agency as massively curtailed, and current, external events.
limited to the more firmly established bodily adoxically drive them physically closer to a potential abuser. Their ability to adapt to, (physical) domain. modify, or avoid the perpetrator's behavior is also constrained by limited mentalizing skills.
Reflective function and pathological
There are several reasons why the family self-development environment of maltreatment is likely to undermine the development of reflective funcThe model of the development of mentalizing capacity which we propose has considerable tion.
First, in abusive families the public world clinical implications, a few of which we will mention here.
of school and community-where reflective function is common and desirable-is often kept very separate from the world of home, Impact of maltreatment on reflective function. Maltreated children, perhaps even more than where the inhumane behavior of an adult makes recognition of the mental state of the insecure ones, are at risk of failing to find their own intentional being within the mind other dangerous to the developing self. Even where a maltreated child benefits from sensiof the caregiver, and are thus at risk of poor development of mentalization. There is accu-tivity and reflectiveness in his public world, so developing an alternative model of relating mulating evidence that maltreatment does impair the child's reflective capacities and sense and experiencing himself, the models derived from public and family experiences are likely of self. Schneider-Rosen and Cicchetti (1984, 1991) noted that abused toddlers showed neu-to be kept insulated from each other, and rigid in their application to the separate contexts. tral or negative affect on recognizing themselves in the mirror, unlike their nonabused Second, the child may have specific problems in dealing with different experience. In peers. Beeghly and Cicchetti (1994) showed that toddlers with a history of maltreatment abusive families the meaning of intentional states may be denied or distorted. Abusive were not retarded in receptive language but were significantly behind in productive lan-parents may claim beliefs and feelings at odds with their behavior. Abuse, particularly within guage, reflecting a withdrawal from social interactions. Their specific deficit was in the the family, prevents the child testing and modifying representations of mental states. relative absence of internal state words and the context-bound (concrete) nature of their Thus, the mental representation of ideas tends to become rigid, maladaptive, and inappropriinternal state language. They also showed less differentiation in attributions. Their internal ate, and consequently may be partially or largely abandoned. state language was particularly sparse in terms of words pertaining to cognition and belief A third possibility is that the maltreated child is forced to construct a model of the states, but was richer for perception and desire. Cicchetti and Beeghly (1987) found that caregiver's mind based on an awareness of analogous mental states in himself. It may be young school-age children who had been maltreated used proportionally fewer words about argued, on the basis of the simulation model, that simulation is compromised by both the internal states, attributed their internal states to fewer social agents, and were more context dissimilarity between the child's mental experience and that of the abuser, and the threat bound than their counterparts who were not maltreated. They appeared to control their that such simulation inevitably brings with it.
If understanding the behavior of his caregivanxiety by modifying their language to exclude certain aspects and contexts associated ers requires the maltreated child to try to generate their probable thoughts and feelings, with maltreatment. This pattern of results suggests that maltreatment may cause children to then he will be confronted with attitudes towards himself which are extremely painful to withdraw from the mental world. For maltreated children, physical experiences proba-recognize: hatred, cruelty, indifference. Abuse could destroy the child's belief that one can bly become more important, and this may par-understand others through one's own feelings sionals and family members. These anomalies can be clarified by more sophisticated devel- (Herman, 1992) , and the child would be likely to inhibit his capacity for simulation in in-opmental theory.
Our chosen framework is provided by "dytense attachment relationships.
A fourth possibility is that the difficulty is namic skills theory" (Fischer & Farrar, 1987; Fischer, Kenny, & Pipp, 1990 ) which depicts not a result of the maltreatment itself, but of the family atmosphere surrounding it (which development as the elaboration of increasingly complex control systems (skills). Remay well also occur where maltreatment does not). Social constructivist ideas concerning the flective function may be readily conceived of as one such control system, critical to the ordevelopment of mentalization (e.g., Astington, 1996) are pertinent here. Authoritarian ganization of the self. Within dynamic skills theory, reflective function would be seen as punishment of bad behavior and demanding of obedience is clearly less facilitating of the not simply a property of the person, but of the person and situation together, because all child's development of mentalization than are equivalent interactions with authoritative par-skills are composed of both the person's activities and the contexts within which these ents, who reason with the child and explain decisions and rules with reference to people's occur. Particular tasks, specific events, other people, as well as culture are seen as part of different points of view (Baumrind, 1971) . There is some evidence that authoritarian par-the skill. Further, the development of a skill is not seen as progression along a singular path, enting is associated with delayed false belief task performance (Holmes, Roldan, & Miller, determined by maturation. Rather, reflective function, as a skill, evolves through varied 1994, cited in Astington, 1996) . As, in a Vygotskian framework, the individual's compe-pathways, molded by many dynamically interacting influences, such as the individual's tence originates in their social interactions and is then internalized, we would expect the ab-emotions, social interaction, family relationships and environment, important social normal patterns of parent-child relations in the families of maltreated children to lead to groups, the reactions of the wider social world, etc. (Fischer, Knight, & Van Parys, 1993 ). a distorted experience of minds. Alessandri (1991 Alessandri ( , 1992 noted that the incompetence of Reflective function is a strand within the developmental web, one of the many distinct maltreated youngsters in pretend symbolic play was mirrored by their mothers' difficulty control systems that are neither strongly connected with each other, nor coordinated or in taking a playful stance with their child, directing their attention, and engaging in posi-integrated (Fischer & Pipp, 1984) . The "fractionation" or splitting of all abilities as a functive interactions. This pattern of results is consistent with the model that the lack of appro-tion of tasks and domains is well demonstrated, and we might expect reflective priate social scaffolding may undermine the normal development of mentalizing in mal-function to be subject to the same kind of developmental décalage (unevenness) which treated children. characterizes the rest of cognitive development (Flavell, 1982) . Fractionation refers to Developmental framework for abnormal reflective function. It is tempting to argue that the tendency for a person not to coordinate skills or experiences that are naturally sepadisorders of conduct and borderline states can be explained as dismissive and preoccupied rate, but may be thought of as belonging together by some external criterion (Fischer & forms of nonmentalizing self-organizations respectively, but this would be simplistic. In Ayoub, 1994) . Just as the understanding of conservation of liquid does not generalize to both instances, there are often variations across situations, or types of relationship. The conservation of area, reflective capacity in one domain of interpersonal interaction should delinquent adolescent is aware of the mental states of other gang members and the border-not be expected to generalize to others. Reflective function does not begin as a general line individual is at times hypersensitive to the affective states of mental health profes-capacity, but is a particular skill tied to the task and domain where it is learned, a specific naturally move toward integration. The family might of course, as we mentioned, support category of relationship. Reflective function as a skill may be more or less present in situa-such splits with sharp dissociations between their public, proper world and their private, tions as a function of contextual support and emotional state, which push an individual up tyrannical one. The split is context and affect dependent; within an attachment theory or down a developmental strand. We have noted above that the child's observed use and framework we might say that the self is organized so that certain internal working models experience of mental state language can differ markedly across social contexts. It is clearly include considerable reflective componentsexpectations incorporating the mental states possible for task-based skills such as reflective function to come to be coordinated, but of self and other-while other working models of relationships appear impoverished, indithis should not be seen as automatic. Unevenness across situations is likely to remain prev-cating only minimal mentalizing skills. In the latter contexts the subject will offer only steralent even in adults, especially when they are emotional (Fischer & Ayoub, 1994) . eotyped, concrete, low level descriptions. This does not imply developmental delay or Normal development is from fractionation towards integration, which involves the coor-regression; rather it suggests a remarkably complex ability to coordinate two distinct levdination of previously separate skills and provides the foundation for more complex, so-els of functioning. The abusive or emotionally depriving world within which they developed phisticated control systems (Bidell & Fischer, 1994) . Abnormalities of reflective function, has engendered in them the sophisticated skills that were required for adaptation. Thus the continued use of a teleological rather than a mentalizing model for predicting behavior, to talk of deficit or absence of a capacity in such individuals is an oversimplification. should not then be seen as either a consequence of arrest and fixation at an early stage, Measures of global abilities may not yield a difference between these individuals and or a regression to that stage. Pathologies in the reflective function of the maltreated child other groups. Efforts at going beyond clinical impression in terms of measurement have to may be expected to develop increased complexity with age and time, in a manner similar take on board the situational specificity of the failure of reflective function. to other skills. The skill for limited reflectiveness developed by the child to anticipate and
We will return to the example of conduct disordered children, for whom we suggest that forestall maltreatment and its painful physical and psychological impact would be adaptive nonreflective internal working models may dominate behavior when an element of conin their original world, but would be expected to produce sophisticated forms of difficulty flict is present within a relationship. Conflict, or rather its adaptive resolution, particularly rather than straightforward adaptations in other contexts (Noam, 1990) . The ability to calls for the perception both of the self and of the other in relation to the self, requiring the be reflective in general, but to show only minimal reflectiveness in the context of one's individual to reconcile his own legitimate claims with concern for the other (Killen & own childhood and parents, or in specific relationships which reactivate the same schemata, Nucci, 1995) . The abnormality of the early family environment of individuals with severe could be a result of natural fractionation. Unevenness or splitting of reflective ability could problems of conduct has been clearest in the context of normal conflicts (Patterson, 1982 ; also be the consequence of an active (purposeful, conscious, or unconscious) attempt Perry, Perry, & Kennedy, 1992) . Here the child with a vulnerable capacity for mentalion the part of the individual not to coordinate or generalize reflective function to specific re-zation finds no affirmation of his intentional stance and fails to acquire the sense of ownerlationship domains. Here the unevenness is a developmental achievement, in that the per-ship or inner endorsement of his actions essential for a sense of self-agency. Consequently son must create a coordination in order actively to keep separate contexts which would his sense of autonomy becomes vulnerable and the importance of his original intention predominant response to emotional situations will be a nonreflective one, readily disowned is exaggerated. The characteristics of oppositional defiant disorder (e.g., negativity, dis-by the self. Naturally the absence of reflective function in such situations will give the apobedience, aggression) may in part be seen as attempts at reasserting self-agency in a rela-pearance of rigidity to the person's behavior as if only a singular pattern of response were tionship where the connection between mental state and action within the self has been un-accessible. Furthermore, the response may frequently be in conflict with social norms bedermined by insensitive and coercive parenting.
cause the tendency to take the perspective of others has been abandoned in that context Abnormalities of parenting represent but one route to limitations on reflective function. and, consequently, the moral emotions used to make judgments about the consequences of The child's biological vulnerabilities such as hyperactivity, attention problems, low im-actions and regulate behavior are absent. The absence of reflective function may further expulse control, are all likely to obstruct the opportunity the child has for evolving a men-aggerate an antisocial response by forcing the individual to see the other not as another intalized reflective model of conflict-related interpersonal situations. Within a dialectic or tentional agent, but in nonhuman terms, as a body, as representing a social position or transactional model there is a bidirectional causality inherent to such biological vulnera-agency, or as a faceless member of a group.
Maltreatment, or more broadly trauma, is bilities: They both provoke situations of conflict and place grave limitations on the child's seen as interacting with the domain-and situation-specific restrictions upon reflective funccapacity to acquire the flexibility needed for their adaptive handling. This may bear on the tion at two levels. First, as we have argued, maltreatment presents the young child with a well demonstrated comorbidity between conduct disorders and hyperactivity or attention powerful emotional disincentive for taking the perspective of others, because of the actual deficit disorder (Kazdin, 1995) . Similarly, factors associated with early behavioral prob-hostility of the intentional stance of the abuser, as well as the constraints upon the self lems, such as poor parental adjustment (maternal aggression, suspiciousness, and mood which an older person's failure to understand the child's budding intentionality imposes. disorder) (Shaw, Owens, Vondra, Keenan, & Winslow, 1996; Zahn-Waxler, Ianotti, Second, the child misses a protective factor, the capacity to understand traumatic interperCummings, & Denham, 1990) , and resources (marital dissatisfaction, parental conflict) sonal situations, which would be likely to limit their impact (Fonagy, Steele, Steele, (Block, Block, & Gjerde, 1986; Campbell, Pierce, Moore, Marakovitz, & Newby, 1996 ) Higgitt, & Target, 1994 . Thus, individuals traumatized by their family environment are may limit the parents' capacity to respond to the child in ways which promote a mentaliz-vulnerable both in terms of the long-term maladaptive effect of their reaction to the trauma ing model of self-other relationships.
The separation of action from intention un-and in terms of their reduced resilience in the face of it. The predominantly nonmentalizing dermines the emotional reaction an individual may have to the consequences of their actions stance adopted in such situations therefore handicaps the individual and, if the vicious since, as Hart and Killen (1995) pointed out, the acquisition of moral emotions requires circle is unbroken, may come to dominate all interpersonal relationships. We believe that at that individuals are "active contributors to their own development, interpreting their this stage severe developmental psychopathology, in the adult entrenched personality disorworld and making judgments that determine their actions in it" (p. 7). Subsequently, the der, is the likely consequence.
